Web/Tech

When judges, political commentary, and social media collide

Stacked3Here is a recent Daily Record column. My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

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When Judges, Political Commentary, and Social Media Collide

I’ve written many times about the use of social media by judges. Generally speaking, I’m in favor of judges using social media and oppose arbitrary restrictions on their social media use. For example, I believe that judges should be permitted to be “friends” on social media with attorneys who appear before them and that doing so does not somehow affect their obligation to remain impartial.

That being said, due to the unique nature of their position, judges are understandably restricted from certain types of online behavior, just as they are when it comes to offline behavior. After all, as I’ve always said, the online is simply an extension of the offline.

So when I read that a Utah judge had been suspended for 6 months as a result of his online interactions, I was concerned. Then I read the opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah in In re: Inquiry of a Judge: the Honorable Judge Michael Kwan. Given the facts of this case, I agree with the Court’s decision.

In this case, it was alleged, among other things, that Judge Kwan had made a number of statements online regarding Donald Trump, both before and after the election. Notably, Judge Kwan had already been reprimanded in the past for making improper statements regarding candidates running for political office, with two separate informal opinions being issued by the Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Committee regarding those incidents. His statements regarding Donald Trump were made after those opinions were handed down.

In the case at hand, Judge Kwan asserted that many of his postings were protected by the First Amendment as constitutionally protected speech. The Court declined to address that argument on procedural grounds, ruling that the judge failed to raise a constitutional objection at the time that the violation occurred, and thus cannot raise it for the first time during the disciplinary proceeding. The Court explained its rationale as follows:

“(W)e have required judges who fail to abide by laws or rules to put the public on notice that their violation is based on a principled contention that the law or rule is, itself, unlawful. Without such notice, a judge may appear to violate laws or rules at will, in disregard of the legal system they are charged with administering. And when judges appear to consider themselves above the law, public confidence in the fair.”

Even though the Court declined to reach his constitutional defense, it nevertheless limited its inquiry to a single posting that the judge himself acknowledged was improper and was not constitutionally protected: a statement that he made that indicated his opposition to a presidential candidate. Specifically, he posted the following in reference to Donald Trump: “Is the fact that the IRS has audited you almost every year when your peers hardly ever or never have been, something to be proud of? What does that say . . . about your business practices?”

The Court concluded that “the single online posting regarding then–presidential candidate Donald Trump, together with the other conduct Judge Kwan admits violated the rules, viewed in light of Judge Kwan’s history of judicial discipline, amply justify the sanction the JCC ordered and we implement.”

In reaching its decision, the Court focused on the role that judges play in our society and emphasized the importance of the appearance of judicial impartiality in fulfilling that role: “Conduct that compromises or appears to compromise the independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the judiciary.”

The Court also explained that upon accepting the responsibility of being part of the judiciary, judges do so with the understanding that they are henceforth obligated to act in a manner that upholds public confidence in the judiciary: “Fulfillment of judicial duties does not come without personal sacrifice of some opportunities and privileges available to the public at large. And as a person the public entrusts to decide issues with utmost fairness, independence, and impartiality, a judge must at times set aside the power of his or her voice—which becomes inextricably tied to his or her position—as a tool to publicly influence the results of a local, regional, or national election.”

I’m in full agreement with the Court’s decision. Certainly judges don’t leave their right to free speech at the door when they enter the judiciary. But their speech is necessarily limited somewhat due to the unique nature of their duties. Judges often have to walk a fine line in that regard, and sometimes they may unintentionally cross it.

But in the case at hand, that line was crossed far too many times in the past, and as a result the judge should have erred on the side of caution when interacting both online and off. He failed to do so and must now face the consequences.

Certainly we’re in the midst of a uniquely turbulent political landscape, and the immediacy and reach of social media can be an enticing way to voice ones views. But even so, it’s important to think before posting. And given their position, judges in particular must tread carefully when addressing political issues, lest they impermissibly cross that line.

Nicole Black is a Rochester, New York attorney, author, journalist, and the Legal Technology Evangelist at MyCase  law practice management software for small law firms. She is the author of the ABA book Cloud Computing for Lawyers, co-authors the ABA book Social Media for Lawyers: the Next Frontier, and co-authors Criminal Law in New York, a Thomson Reuters treatise. She writes legal technology columns for Above the Law and ABA Journal and speaks regularly at conferences regarding the intersection of law and technology. You can follow her on Twitter at @nikiblack or email her at niki.black@mycase.com. 


Email tracking and lawyers: not a great mix

Stacked3Here is a recent Daily Record column. My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

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Email tracking and lawyers: not a great mix

For most lawyers, email is their primary method of correspondence with clients, courts, opposing counsel and others. Over the years, we’ve become increasingly reliant on email because it’s a fairly simple and cost-effective way to communicate.

Of course, as technology has advanced, so too have the tools that can be used to make email more useful. Many of these tools have the end effect of streamlining email correspondence. Email add-ons and built-in features allow users to schedule emails, automate the process of sorting and filing emails, and snooze emails for viewing at a later date, among other things. In most cases, these new features increase the efficiency of email.

But sometimes email add-ons can have a more nefarious purpose. Case in point: email tracking tools. Typically this type of software allows the sender to track a wide range of things, including when a sent email and its attachments are opened, how long the recipient views the email and attachments, how many times they was opened, whether they were forwarded, and the geographical location of the recipient.

Email tracking clearly raises some ethical red flags in the context of lawyer communications, so it’s no surprise that its use by lawyers has been addressed by a number of ethics committees.

First there was New York Opinion 749 (2001), wherein the Committee on Professional Ethics determined that a lawyer may not “use available technology to surreptitiously examine and trace e-mail and other electronic documents.” Then there was the Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee which concluded in Opinion 2016-1 that even if the use of email tracking software is disclosed, its application to emails sent to opposing counsel is ultimately both dishonest and unethical.

Pennsylvania has also issued an opinion addressing email tracking. In Formal Opinion 2017-300 the committee concluded that Pennsylvania lawyers should avoid using email tracking tools with opposing counsel. Most recently, in Opinion 18-01, the Illinois State Bar Association likewise determined that it is unethical for lawyers to use email tracking software with opposing counsel.

Last week, the issue of whether lawyers should use email tracking software once again reared its ugly head, but this time in the context of a war crime court martial. As covered in a number of major news outlets, defense counsel for Edward Gallagher - a man accused of stabbing an Islamic State group militant to death - alleged that the military prosecutor in that case sent an email that included email tracking software to multiple lawyers, paralegals, and a reporter with the Navy Times.

Two weeks after the allegations were made, the judge presiding over the case issued a ruling that resulted in the removal the prosecutor from the case. The reasons for the removal were based on constitutional due process and Sixth Amendment grounds and because the threat of investigation into alleged prosecutorial misconduct could be viewed as a conflict of interest.

If you weren’t already convinced about the perils of lawyers using email tracking, this case offers even more evidence that lawyers and email tracking software are a bad combination. Likewise, it offers additional support for the recommendation I made when I wrote about email tracking software last year - and that I still stand by today:

“For those of you who practice in one of the many jurisdictions where this issue has not yet been addressed, I would suggest that it would be wise to err on the side of caution and, in the absence of consent, avoid using software with opposing counsel that could provide insights regarding their online behavior, whether it’s part of an email program or otherwise. After all, it’s better to be safe than sorry.”

Nicole Black is a Rochester, New York attorney, author, journalist, and the Legal Technology Evangelist at MyCase  law practice management software for small law firms. She is the author of the ABA book Cloud Computing for Lawyers, co-authors the ABA book Social Media for Lawyers: the Next Frontier, and co-authors Criminal Law in New York, a Thomson Reuters treatise. She writes legal technology columns for Above the Law and ABA Journal and speaks regularly at conferences regarding the intersection of law and technology. You can follow her on Twitter at @nikiblack or email her at niki.black@mycase.com. 


Ohio Court on service of process via Amazon messaging

Stacked3Here is a recent Daily Record column. My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

*****

Ohio Court on service of process via Amazon messaging

In 2019, technology affects so many aspects of practicing law. Whether it’s running your law firm using cloud-based billing and practice management software, using legal software to obtain data analytics to assist in litigation, or mining social media for evidence, there’s no escaping the impact of 21st century technologies on the practice of law.

Of course, that’s not always a bad thing, and technology often reduces the tedium of law practice and reduces friction and difficulties often encountered by lawyers in their day-to-day practice. One example of this theory in action is the use of online communication tools for service of process.
Years ago, this was a unique concept that many courts approached with caution. But as online communication and interactions became increasingly common, courts slowly began to allow lawyers to use them to effect service of process.

Fast forward to 2019, and effecting service of process using social media platforms is no longer unheard of. Oftentimes, the platform of choice is Facebook. The first time I wrote about this was in October 2014. At that time, two different judges had issued orders permitting service upon litigants using Facebook: a U.S. Magistrate judge for the Eastern District of Virginia (Whoshere, Inc., v. Gokhan Orun d/b/a/ WhoNear) and a New York family court judge (Noel B. v. Anna Maria A., Docket No. F-00787-13/14B).

Then, in March 2015, another New York judge jumped on the bandwagon and permitted service via Facebook in a matrimonial case (Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku (2015 NY Slip Op 25096)). Next, in 2016, I wrote about Ferrerese v. Shaw,15 CV 3738 (ARR) (CLP), where United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of New York, Cheryl L. Pollak permitted an alternate method of service via Facebook, but also required the plaintiff to attempt to effect service using other methods as well.

I also covered this issue in June of 2017 when I wrote about Axberg v. Langston, Docket No. MRS-C-157 (2016). In this post-adoption case, as reported in the New Jersey Law Journal, Judge Stephan C. Hansbury, Morris County P.J. (ret.), considered the issue of whether service of process could be effected via Facebook and concluded that service via Facebook, and Facebook alone, was a sufficient method of service.

But other platforms have also been used to effect service of process such as WhatsApp, which I wrote about in November 2018. In that case, Alzaabi v. Jaston, a Queens County Supreme Court Justice allowed the plaintiff, who was alleging that the defendant defrauded him via an online sale, to serve process using WhatsApp.

Which brings us to the case at hand, Noco Co. v. Chang, 2019 WL 2135665. In this trademark infringement lawsuit filed in the Northern District of Ohio, the plaintiff alleged that defendant used an Amazon merchant account to sell infringing products. The name registered with the Amazon merchant account was associated with a trademark application under that same name, and listed an address in China.

After multiple failed attempts to obtain a waiver of service from the defendant pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff filed a motion requesting permission to serve the defendant via Amazon messaging in lieu of effecting service using the procedure authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents.

Due to the unique nature of the Hague Convention, the court declined to grant the plaintiff’s request to serve the defendant through online channels. The Court explained its rationale as follows: “Given the fact-specific nature of matters concerning service abroad, the Court makes explicit the facts that dictate that service on Defendant Chang must be transmitted through China’s Ministry of Justice: (1) Defendant Chang appears to live in China, a Hague Convention signatory state that has objected to service by the Article 10 methods; (2) Chang’s physical address is not unknown; (3) the only way to effect service is by transmitting documents abroad (e.g., there is no U.S. subsidiary or U.S. counsel); and (4) Plaintiff has not already attempted to serve Defendant using this method authorized by the Hague Convention.”

Notably, the Court lamented that the requirements of the Hague Convention necessitated service of process using more traditional methods, in large part due to their lack of expediency: “Requiring Plaintiff to wait many months for service feels shockingly out-of-step with today’s fast-paced e-commerce…However, the Court’s hands are tied. Plaintiff NOCO must serve Defendant Chang through China’s Ministry of Justice.”

So in this case, 21st century methods were rejected. But I would suggest it’s a rather unique situation and that more often than not, especially where disputed transactions occurred online and other more traditional attempts at service of process have failed, courts will increasingly consider 21st century online options. So don’t rule them out.

It’s 2019 and the world is changing rapidly. You can’t practice law in a vacuum and technological change is a reality. Litigation is not immune from its effects, so if you’re a litigator make sure you’re technologically savvy and are taking steps to incorporate technology learning into your daily routine. At the end of the day, you’ll be a better lawyer, thus more able to provide the best possible representation for your clients. And after all, isn’t that what the practice of law is all about?

Nicole Black is a Rochester, New York attorney, author, journalist, and the Legal Technology Evangelist at MyCase  law practice management software for small law firms. She is the author of the ABA book Cloud Computing for Lawyers, co-authors the ABA book Social Media for Lawyers: the Next Frontier, and co-authors Criminal Law in New York, a Thomson Reuters treatise. She writes legal technology columns for Above the Law and ABA Journal and speaks regularly at conferences regarding the intersection of law and technology. You can follow her on Twitter at @nikiblack or email her at niki.black@mycase.com. 


Lawyers and technology competency: Louisiana weighs in

Stacked3Here is a recent Daily Record column. My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

*****

Lawyers and technology competency: Louisiana weighs in

In 2019, lawyers have a duty to stay on top of changes in technology. This requirement first appeared in 2012 when the ABA amended the comments to Model Rule 1.1 to indicate that technology competence is a requirement for lawyers. Specifically, Comment 8 was amended to include the following:

Maintaining Competence
To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.
Since then the majority of jurisdictions (36) have adopted this requirement.

In 2018 Louisiana joined their ranks in its own unique way when it amended its Code of Professionalism (which is a set of principles separate from its Rules of Professional Conduct) by adding the following two provisions regarding technology competence:

“I will use technology, including social media, responsibly. My words and actions, no matter how conveyed, should reflect the professionalism expected of me as a lawyer.”
“I will stay informed about changes in the law, communication, and technology which affect the practice of law.”

Notably, these two statements regarding technology differ quite a bit from the language that the other jurisdictions have incorporated into their Rules of Professional Conduct. While this choice of wording and the decision to include the statements in the Code of Professionalism rather than amending the Rules of Professional Conduct may at first blush seem insignificant, a recent ethics opinion issued by the Louisiana State Bar Association is indicative of a perspective on technology competence - and on technology itself - that differs substantially from that of other jurisdictions.

Under consideration in PUBLIC Opinion 19-RPCC-021 (online:
http://files.lsba.org/documents/Ethics/EthicsOpinionLawyersUseTech02062019.pdf), which was handed down in February, was the ethical obligations of lawyers who use technology. Importantly, in framing the issue, the Bar seemed to imply that lawyers do not necessarily need to use technology in order to practice law in 2019, and that if they choose to do so, only then do they have an obligation to understand it.

The focus of the opinion is on the many dangers of using technology, with an emphasis on the many risks lawyers face when doing so. The tenor of the opinion is evident from the very start when the Bar characterizes the approach taken any other jurisdictions in the following manner:

“The consensus is that if a lawyer is going to use technology, that lawyer has a duty to comply with Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.6 and 1.15 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers must use technology competently and diligently. (Emphasis added).”

Then towards the end of the opinion the Bar again suggests that using technology is a choice for lawyers:

“(I)f a lawyer chooses to use technology in the lawyer’s practice, basic issues must be addressed. (Emphasis added).”

Compare these statements to the explanatory language quoted above (that most states have adopted into the comments to their Rules of Professional Conduct):

“To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”

In the preceding sentence, knowledge of technology is part of the duty to maintain competence. Technology know-how is not optional and it is not something that a lawyer can avoid simply by choosing not to use technology.

In other words, the consensus regarding technology competence is not that lawyers must be competent only if they choose to use technology. Instead the consensus is that in 2019, lawyers must understand technology so that they can make educated decisions regarding whether and how to use it in their practices.

This is an important distinction since in 2019 it is impossible for lawyers to practice law without encountering - and thus necessarily gaining an understanding of - technology in one form or another. And the failure of lawyers to understand how a given technology works and how it will affect their clients’ matters is a violation of the duty of competence at best, and malpractice at worst.

For example, litigators need to understand how social media platforms work in order to assess whether social media evidence exists that would benefit or harm their clients’ matters. The failure to do so could arguably result in malpractice in some cases.

Similarly many jurisdictions are now requiring e-filing in some courts. A basic understanding of the concepts related to digital documents and e-filing, including proper redaction techniques, is needed in order to competently represent clients and timely file papers with the court.

For other lawyers, a basic understanding of ediscovery procedures is a prerequisite to competent representation of their clients. Similarly for lawyers handling matters involving potentially sensitive issues secure client communication options other than unencrypted email must be carefully considered in order to properly protect confidential client data.

These are only a few examples of how technology unavoidably overlaps with the practice of law. So, to put it mildly, I was extremely surprised by the tenor of the Louisiana opinion. Not only does it represent a marked shift from the approach taken by other jurisdictions - it seemingly flies in the face of the realities of practicing law in the 21st century. The proper framework for addressing the impact of technology on the practice of law and lawyers’ ethical obligations when doing so is not to ask if a lawyer will use technology, but when.

Nicole Black is a Rochester, New York attorney, author, journalist, and the Legal Technology Evangelist at MyCase  law practice management software for small law firms. She is the author of the ABA book Cloud Computing for Lawyers, co-authors the ABA book Social Media for Lawyers: the Next Frontier, and co-authors Criminal Law in New York, a Thomson Reuters treatise. She writes legal technology columns for Above the Law and ABA Journal and speaks regularly at conferences regarding the intersection of law and technology. You can follow her on Twitter at @nikiblack or email her at niki.black@mycase.com. 


When emojis and the law collide

Stacked3Here is a recent Daily Record column. My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

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When I started writing about the intersection of law and technology in 2006, emojis were a sidebar in the world of communication. Until the release of the first smartphone, the iPhone, emojis were typically used only in certain online chat rooms. But with the release of the iPhone in 2007, people were able to use emojis more often using various messaging apps. And then when iOS 6 was released in 2012, iPhone users were able to easily include emojis in Apple’s native messaging platform. From there, emojis become a common part of everyday communication.

Of course, as is often the case, whenever technological advancements occur - especially in the realm of communications - a notable impact on legal proceedings soon follows. For example, in 2011 I wrote a column focused on a witness intimidation case covered in the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle. It was a federal court case where the defendant was alleged to have “poked” someone on Facebook, and in doing so was alleged to have intimidated a witness. The judge conducting the arraignment admitted that he lacked sufficient knowledge regarding the nature of a Facebook poke, as did the attorneys appearing on the matter. The judge then asked the courtroom spectators if anyone could explain the concept and refused to move forward with the arraignment until he was satisfied by the explanation provided by a reporter who happened to be in the courtroom.

That was the very first time I had encountered a report of social media impacting a criminal matter so I found it to be of great interest. Of course, since 2011, social media references in court cases have increased exponentially. Notably, that same phenomenon is now occurring with emojis as they become commonplace in many of our digital communications, and references to emojis and emoticons in court cases have increased significantly in recent years.

In 2004, there was a single case that referenced the word “emoticon.” Fast forward to 2012, and there were 7. In 2015, there were 15 cases that referenced either the terms “emoji” or “emoticon,” and last year that number had increased to 53. (For a full list of references see this post.)

The most recent case (from March 12th) that references the term “emoji” appeared in a California Court of Appeal case that also involved allegations of intimidating a witness. In People v. Smith, 2019 WL 1122768, at issue was whether the evidence, which included Facebook comments that included emojis, was sufficient to convict the defendant of intimidating a witness.

The Court concluded that the emoji evidence at issue supported the defendant’s conviction of intimidating the witness, “T.R.,” a 15-yo victim in a pimping case:

“The comments contained emojis of rodents. The later comments, following T.R.'s other name, “[T.W.],” included gunshot emojis, gun emojis, and the statement, ‘share my post.’ The four gunshot emojis and three gun emojis were evidence Smith was seeking to encourage other viewers of his Facebook page to shoot T.R. His comments included three emojis, each representing a hand with the thumb and forefinger touching and the other fingers pointed up, representing the letter “b,” a symbol of the Bacc Street Crips. The jury could have reasonably concluded from the photograph and comments that Smith intended to communicate that T.R. was a despised female who had told on Washington, and she was therefore a “rat” or snitch whom members of the gang should kill to assure she did not testify against Washington at his trial.

Additionally, Smith “hashtagged” T.R., notifying her of the post. This evidenced an intent that she see the photograph and comments and cower accordingly, i.e., by not testifying against Washington at his trial.”

It’s undoubtedly a bit strange to read a court’s attempt to interpret the cartoon-like characters that are finding their way into our daily communications. But expect to see more of this - much more - as our use of electronic forms of communication continue to increase. Like it or not, emojis - and technology in general - are here to stay.

Nicole Black is a Rochester, New York attorney, author, journalist, and the Legal Technology Evangelist at MyCase  law practice management software for small law firms. She is the author of the ABA book Cloud Computing for Lawyers, co-authors the ABA book Social Media for Lawyers: the Next Frontier, and co-authors Criminal Law in New York, a Thomson Reuters treatise. She writes legal technology columns for Above the Law and ABA Journal and speaks regularly at conferences regarding the intersection of law and technology. You can follow her on Twitter at @nikiblack or email her at niki.black@mycase.com. 


Pennsylvania Supreme Court on ethically mining social media evidence

Stacked3Here is a recent Daily Record column. My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

*****

Pennsylvania Supreme Court on ethically mining social media evidence

Social media can be a gold mine for litigation attorneys. There’s a wealth of information available online that can often be used to the benefit of your client at trial. The trick is knowing how to ethically access social media evidence. Because if you don’t fully understand the ins and outs of the various social media platforms and your ethical obligations, your attempts to obtain online evidence favorable to your client’s case could have the opposite result: it could be precluded from use at trial, and you could even face disciplinary action.

The latter is what occurred when a Pennsylvania attorney’s law license was suspended by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Stacy Parks Miller, Miller’s license was suspended, in part, due to her deceptive behavior in creating a fictitious Facebook page in order to obtain evidence while serving as the Centre County District Attorney.

Specifically, it was alleged that Miller created a fictitious Facebook page in 2011, with the end goal being to curb criminal activity relating to the illegal sale of bath salts. The Facebook page was based on a fake social media persona and purported to be the social media account of a young woman who had recently dropped out of college.

After creating the page she sent an email encouraging her staff to send “friend requests” to others from the fake account in order to legitimize the fake account. Specifically she suggested that they use the Facebook account to “masquerade” and “snoop” on Facebook. While the account was being used by the District Attorney’s Office, “individuals represented in criminal proceedings either sent friend requests to the page or received friend requests from the page.”

In her defense, Miller asserted that the Facebook page represented a “proper law enforcement operation.” The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed. The Board noted that the mere act of “having a third-person send a friend request to a represented party in order to gain access to the private portion of their profile violates RPC 8.4(c), and that the actions of Miller far exceeded that limited scope of impermissible conduct. Not only did she create a fake Facebook page, she provided her staff with access to it and actively encouraged them to use it to repeatedly interact with and connect with other individuals on Facebook who were suspected of engaging in illegal activities, some of whom were known to be represented by counsel."

Accordingly, the Board concluded that her actions were in violation of her ethical obligations. The Board explained that “(t)he Facebook page created by (Miller) and disseminated to her staff was fake and constituted fraudulent and deceptive conduct inn violation of RPC 8.4(c)…(Miller) induced her staff, both attorneys and non-attorneys alike, to engage in dishonest behavior and to imply disinterest in matters, without correcting any misapprehensions. The staff carried out (Miller’s) directives and used the page to “friend” individuals, some of whom were defendants. (Miller) enabled her staff to engage in deceptive conduct, without specific direction, for an unrestricted period of time. This conduct violated RPC 4.3(a), 4.3(c), 5.3(b), 5.3(c)(1), and 5.3(c)(2).” As such the Board recommended that her law license be suspended for one year and one day.

This is yet one more example of lawyers interacting online without fully understanding their ethical obligations. Certainly there is a wealth of information - and potential evidence - available on social media platforms, and in 2019, willfully ignoring its existence is arguably malpractice. But before attempting to access information posted online, make sure that you have full knowledge of how the platforms work and what your ethical obligations are in regard to accessing that data. Tread lightly and intelligently when mining social media for evidence, lest you face the same penalty as Ms. Miller.

 

Nicole Black is a Rochester, New York attorney, author, journalist, and the Legal Technology Evangelist at MyCase  law practice management software for small law firms. She is the author of the ABA book Cloud Computing for Lawyers, co-authors the ABA book Social Media for Lawyers: the Next Frontier, and co-authors Criminal Law in New York, a Thomson Reuters treatise. She writes legal technology columns for Above the Law and ABA Journal and speaks regularly at conferences regarding the intersection of law and technology. You can follow her on Twitter at @nikiblack or email her at niki.black@mycase.com. 


How Lawyers Are Using Social Media in 2019

Stacked3Here is a recent Daily Record column. My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

*****

How Lawyers Are Using Social Media in 2019

I’ve been covering lawyers’ use of social media in my column for the Daily Record since 2008. Back then, most lawyers believed that social media was a passing fad, despite my ardent assertions to the contrary. Some even believed that it was both unethical and unwise for lawyers to use social media. Convincing lawyers that social media was a phenomenon that they needed to learn about was an uphill battle, to say the least.

How times have changed. I first became convinced that a dramatic shift was occurring in 2011 when a reporter for the Democrat and Chronicle, Gary Craig, wrote an article entitled “Threat Alleged Via Facebook ‘Poke.’” As explained in the article, a federal judge was unable to proceed with an arraignment of a defendant who was accused of threatening a witness via a Facebook “poke.” The judge had no idea what a “poke” was, and neither did the attorneys before him, so he sought out - and obtained - the information he needed from a spectator seated in courtroom.

For me, that was a turning point. Because that’s when I knew that social media was actually impacting cases, and that lawyers were finally going to begin to take notice and want to learn about - and use -social media.

Fast forward to 2019, and these days, according to the latest Legal Technology Survey Report issued by the American Bar Association, the majority of lawyers and law firms are using social media for professional reasons in one form or another, whether it’s for business development and networking or for litigation purposes.

According to the Report, 76% of lawyers surveyed reported that their firms maintained a presence on at least once social network. And 79% of lawyers reported that they personally used social media for professional reasons. The reasons for their online interactions varied, with 70% citing career development and networking as their motivating reasons. 54% hoped to obtain clients as a result of their participation online. 48% used social media as a tool to increase their education awareness. And finally, 30% used social media to investigate their cases.

For those lawyers seeking to drum up business as a result of their online interactions, some were successful, with 35% reporting that they’d had a client retain their services directly or via a referral because of their social media use for professional purposes. 46% indicated that their online interaction never resulted in a new client, and 19% weren’t sure.

According to the Report, the most popular social media network amongst lawyers is LinkedIn. 46% of lawyers indicated that their law firms maintained a LinkedIn presence, and 65% reported that they personally maintained a LinkedIn profile for professional purposes.

The second most popular site is Facebook, with 42% of lawyers reporting that their law firms maintained a Facebook presence. 37% of responding lawyers shared that they personally used Facebook for professional reasons, and 90% indicated that they participated on Facebook for personal, non-professional purposes.

Next was Twitter, with 14% of respondents indicating that their law firms maintained a Twitter presence, and 25% reported that they interacted on Twitter for professional reasons using personal accounts. 1% of lawyers reported that a client had retained them as a result of their use of Twitter for professional reasons.

Then there are blogs, which have been around longer than social media, but have decreased in popularity with lawyers over the last few years. According to the Report, 24% of law firms maintain a blog. And, 8% of lawyers reported that they personally maintained a blog focused on a legal topic, down from 15% last year. Finally, 36% reported that a client has retained their services because of their blogging efforts, down from 43% last year. So legal blogging is clearly on the decline, but nevertheless is still a very viable business development tool.

So there you have it: lots of statistics on how lawyers are using social media. And, yes, unlike 2008, the majority of lawyers are learning about - and using - social media in 2019. Are you one of those lawyers? Is your law firm using social media? Are you? How does your social media use compare?

 

 

Nicole Black is a Rochester, New York attorney, author, journalist, and the Legal Technology Evangelist at MyCase  law practice management software for small law firms. She is the author of the ABA book Cloud Computing for Lawyers, co-authors the ABA book Social Media for Lawyers: the Next Frontier, and co-authors Criminal Law in New York, a Thomson Reuters treatise. She writes legal technology columns for Above the Law and ABA Journal and speaks regularly at conferences regarding the intersection of law and technology. You can follow her on Twitter at @nikiblack or email her at niki.black@mycase.com. 


Louisiana court: Online anonymity doesn’t shield lawyers from ethical obligations

Stacked3Here is a recent Daily Record column. My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

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Louisiana court: Online anonymity doesn’t shield lawyers from ethical obligation

Office water coolers used to be gathering places where people discussed current events and caught up on office gossip. But, like many other time-honored traditions, even water cooler conversations have been affected by technology.

Certainly these in-office discussions still occur, but much of the day-to-day discourse about current events has shifted to the online realm. Whether it’s on Facebook, in online forums, or in the comments that follow news articles, there are plenty of opportunities to comment on and share opinions about recent events. Notably, many of these comments can be made anonymously, and as a result, some people are less restrained about their opinions than they would be if their personal identities were publicly attached to them.

Of course, the perceived anonymity is often an illusion, since there are many different ways to go about determining who posted a particular comment, should the need arise to do so. That’s a lesson that was learned the hard way by Salvadore R. Perricone, an assistant U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Last month, the Supreme Court of Louisiana handed down an opinion, In re: Salvadore R. Perricone, No. 2018-B-1233, wherein the court considered whether Perricone violated his ethical obligations as a result of anonymous comments that he posted online between 2007-2014. Some of the comments related to trials for which he was the prosecuting attorney and others related to trials that his colleagues were prosecuting.

The anonymous postings included the following comments:

A statement that the defense attorney had “screwed his client!!!!,”and was just “as arrogant as [the allegedly bribed official] … and the jury knows it.”
During a federal civil rights trial involving the shooting of an unarmed man he wrote: “Perhaps we would be safer if the NOPD would leave next hurricane and let the National Guard assume all law enforcement duties.  GUILTY AS CHARGED.”
Regarding an indictment alleging conspiracy: “I read the indictment…there is no legitimate reason for this type of behavior in such a short period of time and for a limited purpose. GUILTY!!!”

When his comments were discovered and reported to a judge, an investigation was conducted and disciplinary charges were filed. After reviewing the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, the Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that the appropriate sanction for Perricone’s conduct was disbarment.

The Court explained that Perricone’s actions were not innocuous: “When discovered, respondent’s actions caused serious, actual harm in the River Birch and Danziger Bridge cases and, most profoundly, to the reputation of the USAO. There was a potential for harm in the Jefferson and Gill-Pratt cases.”

According to the Court, disbarment was necessary for a number of reasons, not the least of which was to send a message to other lawyers to tread carefully when posting online about pending matters: “Respondent’s conscious decision to vent his anger by posting caustic, extrajudicial comments about pending cases strikes at the heart of the neutral dispassionate control which is the foundation of our system. Our decision today must send a strong message to respondent and to all the members of the bar that a lawyer’s ethical obligations are not diminished by the mask of anonymity provided by the Internet.”

In other words, the lesson to be learned is one that I often repeat: the online is simply an extension of the offline world. You don’t leave your ethics at the door when you enter the online realm. Think before you post - anonymously or otherwise - and refrain from commenting about any matters that you are personally involved in or about which you have inside knowledge. Your ethical obligations require it, and your law license depends on it.

Nicole Black is a Rochester, New York attorney, author, journalist, and the Legal Technology Evangelist at MyCase  law practice management software for small law firms. She is the author of the ABA book Cloud Computing for Lawyers, co-authors the ABA book Social Media for Lawyers: the Next Frontier, and co-authors Criminal Law in New York, a Thomson Reuters treatise. She writes legal technology columns for Above the Law and ABA Journal and speaks regularly at conferences regarding the intersection of law and technology. You can follow her on Twitter at @nikiblack or email her at niki.black@mycase.com. 


Round Up: Billing and Calendaring Software, Cybersecurity, and Millennial Lawyers

SpiralI often write articles and blog posts for other outlets and am going to post a round up here from time to time (but won't include my weekly Daily Record articles in the round up since I re-publish them to this blog in full). Here are my posts and articles from November 2018:


Supreme Court of Florida weighs in on judges using social media

Stacked3Here is a recent Daily Record column. My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

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Supreme Court of Florida weighs in on judges using social media

Whether judges should use social media has been a contentious issue for some time now. Early on, the consensus seemed to be that it was problematic for judges to do so, but over time that’s changed.

So, for example in 2012, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Pierre Domville v. State of Florida, No. 4D12-556 and disqualified a judge from overseeing a case because the judge was Facebook “friends” with the prosecuting attorney. But then in August of this year, the Third District Court of Appeal in Florida in in Law Offices of Herssein and Herssein v. United States Automobile Association, No. 3D17-1421 addressed the very same issue and reached a different conclusion. The court determined that it was departing from the holding in Domville and was declining to disqualify a judge as a result of his Facebook connnection with an attorney appearing in his court, since online friends are “not necessarily (friends) in the traditional sense of the word” and thus the fact that a judge is Facebook ‘friends’ with a lawyer for a potential party or witness does not necessarily mean that the judge cannot be impartial.

Just last week, the Supreme Court of Florida considered this case on appeal in Herssein and Herssein v. United States Automobile Association, No. SC17-1848. At issue was whether the lower court correctly determined that a Facebook friendship between a judge and an attorney appearing for the judge was not, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for disqualification of the judge.

In reaching its decision, the court first examined the concept of a “friendship,” explaining that simply being friends with someone does not indicate the level of closeness of the friendship: “It is commonly understood that friendship exists on a broad spectrum: some friendships are close and others are not...Thus the mere existence of a friendship, in and of itself, does not inherently reveal the degree or intensity of the friendship.”

Next, the Court applied this understanding to the concept of a Facebook “friendship” and concluded that not all Facebook friendships between a judge and an attorney appearing in their court require disqualification. The court examined the nature of Facebook connections, explaining that “(t)he establishment of a Facebook ‘friendship’ does not objectively signal the existence of the affection and esteem involved in a traditional ‘friendship’...(and) it is regularly the case that Facebook “friendships” are more casual and less permanent than traditional friendships.”

Accordingly, the Court reached the same conclusion as the majority of other jurisdictions that have recently addressed this issue and held that a Facebook friendship, in and of itself, was insufficient to warrant disqualification: “(T)he mere existence of a Facebook ‘friendship’ between a judge and an attorney appearing before the judge, without more, does not reasonably convey to others the impression of an inherently close or intimate relationship. No reasonably prudent person would fear that she could not receive a fair and impartial trial based solely on the fact that a judge and an attorney appearing before the judge are Facebook ‘friends’ with a relationship of an indeterminate nature.”

This is, I believe, the correct decision. As I’ve opined in the past, judges are simply people and have lives outside the courtroom which include friendships with attorney colleagues that pre-date their appointment to the bench. It flies in the face of common sense to issue decisions that prevent judges from interacting on social media with the very same lawyers with whom they are already connected and with whom they regularly interact in public. It’s heartening to see that the Florida Supreme Court agrees with this position and has issued a ruling that aligns with the realities of living in the 21st century.

Nicole Black is a Rochester, New York attorney, author, journalist, and the Legal Technology Evangelist at MyCase  law practice management software for small law firms. She is the author of the ABA book Cloud Computing for Lawyers, co-authors the ABA book Social Media for Lawyers: the Next Frontier, and co-authors Criminal Law in New York, a Thomson Reuters treatise. She writes legal technology columns for Above the Law and ABA Journal and speaks regularly at conferences regarding the intersection of law and technology. You can follow her on Twitter at @nikiblack or email her at niki.black@mycase.com.