Sui Generis--a New York law blog

Is justice obtained if not consistently applied?

This week's Daily Record column is entitled "Is justice obtained if not consistently applied?"

A pdf of the article can be found here and my past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

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Is justice obtained if not consistently applied?

The death penalty is one of the few issues with which I have difficulty reconciling my rather liberal criminal defense tendencies.

While the concept of the state executing another human being is repugnant to me, I find that on rare occasions the sordid facts of a highly disturbing case cause a little voice inside
my head to whisper convincingly, “if ever a case merited such a severe penalty, it’s this one.”

The recently decided U.S. Supreme Court opinion, Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, is just such a case.

As a mother of two children, I am particularly repulsed by allegations of a rape committed against a defenseless and helpless child. The underlying facts of this case are heart wrenching. The victim was just eight years old when she was brutally raped by her stepfather, resulting in injuries so severe that she required emergency reparative surgery.

Of all the non-fatal cases that might warrant the death penalty, this reprehensible crime most certainly fits the bill. This poor child’s life will never be the same.

Not surprisingly, my feelings were mixed when I learned the court held that imposing the death penalty in child rape cases violated the Constitution. Specifically, the majority of the court concluded that the Eighth Amendment prevented Louisiana from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child in cases where the crime did not result, nor was intended to result, in the death of the victim.

However, I began to experience an overwhelming sense of relief as I read the majority opinion. The decision was well grounded, both in policy and legal precedent. Despite the horrendous facts of the
case, the court made the correct determination and spared us, as a society, of the burden of attempting to navigate an untraversable slippery slope.

The crux of the issue was not of retribution, but rather, one of practical application. The court focused on the severity and finality of the death penalty and the likelihood that its application would prove to be anything but consistent in child rape cases:

“We find it difficult to identify standards that would guide the decision maker so the penalty is reserved for the most severe cases of child rape and yet not imposed in an arbitrary way… In this context, which involves a crime that in many cases will overwhelm a decent person’s judgment, we have no confidence that the imposition of the death penalty would not be so arbitrary as to be ‘freakis[h].’ … We cannot sanction this result when the harm to the victim, though grave, cannot be quantified in the same way as death of the victim. … Evolving standards of decency are difficult to reconcile with a regime that seeks to expand the death penalty to an area where standards to confine its use are indefinite and obscure.”

The potential for the arbitrary application of the death penalty in child rape cases is extraordinary. The lack of uniform implementation of such an irrevocable and final sentence would be anything but just. And justice simply cannot be assured in the absence of consistency.

Unlikely Inferences Do Not a Felony Make

This week's Daily Record column is entitled "Unlikely Inferences Do Not a Felony Make."

A pdf of the article can be found here and my past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

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Unlikely Inferences Do Not a Felony Make

Last week the New York State Court of Appeals handed down its decision in People v. Finley,2008 WL 2338613.

At issue was whether small amounts of marijuana smuggled into New York correctional facilities by inmates constituted “dangerous contraband” pursuant to Penal Law §§ 205.00(4) and 205.25(2), thus rising to the level of a felony.

The court considered appeals from decisions of the Third and Fourth Departments, both of which concluded the possession of marijuana did, in fact, amount to felonious conduct, even though the amounts possessed were relatively small.

The Court of Appeals framed the issue as follows: “[W]hether the imposition of felony consequences, based upon possession of small amounts of marihuana, which would constitute a violation outside of prison (see Penal Law §§ 221.05, 221.10 [2] [absent aggravating circumstances, not present here, possession of 25 grams or less of marihuana is a non-criminal violation]), comports with the Legislature’s intent as codified in Penal Law §§ 205.00 (4) and 205.25 (2).”

In reaching its determination, the court first noted the Penal Law created a distinction between “contraband” and “dangerous contraband.”

The possession of ordinary contraband, simply a misdemeanor, is defined as “any article or thing which a person confined in a detention facility is prohibited from obtaining or possessing by statute, rule, regulation or order.” Possession of “dangerous contraband,” on the other hand, is defined as that “which is capable of endanger[ing] the safety or security of a detention facility or any person therein.”

In the underlying cases, the Appellate Divisions concluded the inmates’ possession of a small amount of marijuana created a potentially dangerous condition, which could feasibly result in disobedience and altercations among inmates and with correctional officers.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, based in part on the legislative intent behind the passage of the Penal Law provisions at issue. 

The court noted that, by enacting legislation creating levels of penalies for the possession of “contraband” as opposed to “dangerous contraband,” the Legislature obviously intended to differentiate between the two.

The court stated that: “Under the people’s view, the Legislature intended a definition of dangerous contraband so broad that it would capture any item that, when present in a detention facility, could lead to altercations and inmate disobedience. But the fatal flaw in the people’s argument is that their proposed construction would effectively nullify the misdemeanor crime of promoting contraband in the second degree. ... If, as the Appellate Divisions here held, testimony as to these possibly pernicious secondary effects were sufficient to establish the felony promoting contraband offense then every item of contraband could be classified as dangerous.”

Finally, the court concluded contraband is dangerous only if there is a substantial probability the item will be used in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury; facilitate an escape or pose a threat to institutional safety or security.

This is the only conclusion that makes sense.

I reviewed the Appellate Division decisions last year when preparing the supplement to “Criminal Law in New York, Fourth Edition,” a Thomson-West treatise that I co-author with Judge Karen Morris and Gary Muldoon.

I recall thinking the Appellate Divisions’ conclusions were somewhat attenuated from reality, given the possibility of institutional chaos resulting from possession of such a small amount of marijuana is remote, at best.

This latest decision, therefore, is a pleasant and unexpected surprise. After all, it’s not every day the highest court in New York agrees with the conclusions of a criminal defense attorney such as myself.

Youthful Inexperience Is Not a Crime

This week's Daily Record column is entitled "Youthful Inexperience Is Not a Crime."  The article is set forth in full below and a pdf of the article can be found here.

My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

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Youthful inexperience is not a crime

Last week, the New York Court of Appeals handed down its decision in People v. Cabrera, 2008 NY Slip Op 03994.

In this case, the 17 year-old defendant, Brett Cabrera, was driving an SUV in Sullivan County with four teenage passengers.

It is estimated he was traveling at about 70 mph in a 55- mph zone and failed to slow down in a curve for which the recommended speed limit was 40 mph.

His vehicle skidded off the roadway and into a tele- phone pole. Three of his passengers were killed, and the other suffered a fractured spine. None were wearing seatbelts. Cabrera was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the accident.

A jury convicted Cabrera of three counts of criminally negligent homicide, assault in the third degree, reckless driving and other traffic infractions. He was sentenced to 1 1/3 to 4 years in state prison. He served the full length of his sentence in a maximum-security prison while his appeal was pending.

The verdict and sentence were upheld by the Third Department. The majority opinion acknowledged that the New York Court of Appeals had previously held that excessive speed alone could not form the basis for a conviction based on a showing of recklessness or culpable negligence, but concluded that the necessary level of culpability was established in light of the evidence that Cabrera committed two traffic violations: failing to ensure that no more than two passengers were under the age of 21; and failing to require that all passengers were wear seat belts.

When I wrote about this case a few months ago, I lamented the Third Department’s decision and was hopeful that the Court of Appeals would reverse the ruling.

Last week, my hopes became reality when the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Third Department, concluding that Cabrera’s, traffic violations did not cause or contribute to the crash.

The court held that:

The question on this appeal is therefore whether, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence adduced at trial showed that Cabrera's conduct constituted "not only a failure to perceive a risk of death, but also some serious blameworthiness in the
conduct that caused it" (Boutin, 75 NY2d at 696). Measured by that standard, the evidence falls short. For a 17-year-old to badly misgauge his ability to handle road conditions is not the kind of seriously condemnatory behavior that the Legislature envisioned when it defined
"criminal negligence," even though the consequences here were fatal...

This crash resulted from noncriminal failure to perceive
risk; it was not the result of criminal risk creation.

This was a horrific and devastating accident that will no doubt haunt Cabrera for the rest of his life.  What happened in this case was a tragedy for all involved. Young lives were needlessly lost as a result of Cabrera’s negligence.

However, as the Court of Appeals aptly noted, negligent conduct does not necessarily constitute criminal conduct.  If ever there was a case in which prosecutorial discretion was called for, this was it.  Instead, discretion was thrown to the wind and a young man was criminally prosecuted and convicted for the crime of youthful inexperience.

Fortunately, the Court of Appeals had the good sense to reverse this travesty of justice and allow the issue of Cabrera’s negligence to be prosecuted in the proper venue:  civil court.

Generally Speaking, Death By Speeding Not a Crime

Last week, the New York Court of Appeals handed down its decision in People v. Cabrera, 2008 NY Slip Op 03994.  I wrote about this case in my Daily Record column last September and was quoted in March in this article from Sullivan County's newspaper, the Times Herald-Record. 

In both instances I stated that it was my opinion that the Third Department incorrectly upheld the jury's verdict, which convicted Mr. Cabrera of three counts of criminally negligent homicide, assault in the third degree, reckless driving and a number of traffic infractions.  The Third Department reasoned that the verdict was supported by the traffic violations convictions, which included failure to keep right, driving left of a yellow line and violations of his junior license restrictions (namely that he failed to ensure no more than two passengers were under the age of 21 and that all passengers were wearing seat belts).

It was my opinion that:

In this case, a 17-year-old boy who possessed a junior driver’s license was sentenced to one and one-third to four years in state prison for doing what inexperienced teenage drivers have done since the advent of motor vehicles — exercising poor judgment while driving too fast...Civil liability does not necessarily amount to criminal liability...The vast majority of errors in judgment simply do not rise to the level of culpable conduct required for a criminal conviction.

The New York Court of Appeals (at least the majority of the court, in this case) and I apparently see eye to eye on this issue.  The Court held that:

For a 17-year-old to badly misgauge his ability to handle road conditions is not the kind of seriously condemnatory behavior that the Legislature envisioned when it defined "criminal negligence," even though the consequences here were fatal. This crash resulted from noncriminal failure to perceive risk; it was not the result of criminal risk creation.

My faith in humanity is restored--at least temporarily.

 

Voices From the Grave

This week's Daily Record column is entitled "Voices from the grave."  The article is set forth in full below and a pdf of the article can be found here.

My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

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Voices from the grave.

Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Giles v.California,No. 07-6053.

At issue was whether the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers was violated where the trial court admitted the dead victim’s prior statements into evidence, where the statements implicated the defendant in her murder.

Last year, the New York State Court of Appeals considered a similar issue in People v. Nieves-Andino, 2007 NY Slip Op 05584, but never reached the constitutional mer- its of the issue, concluding instead that the victim’s state- ments were not testimonial.

In Nieves, Jose Millares, the victim who later died, was discovered lying in the road by a police officer respond- ing to a 911 call regarding shots fired.

The responding officer summoned an ambulance and then asked Millares for his name and other pedigree information. He also asked him what had happened. Millares responded that he had argued with a man named Bori who had shot him three times.

The defendant argued that admitting the victim’s statement into evidence at trial would violate his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford v. Washington. The prosecution argued that the statement fell under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule and that its admission would not violate the Sixth Amendment.

The court concluded the victim’s statements did not violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him since the officer’s primary purpose in questioning Millares was to address an ongoing emergency, and thus the statements were not testimonial in the first instance: “Our decision is guided by Crawford v. Washington(541 US 36 [2004]) and Davis v. Washington (126 S Ct 2266 [2006]). In those cases, the Supreme Court held the Federal Confrontation Clause prohibits the ‘admission of testimonial
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination’ (Davis, 126 S Ct at 2273). Only statements that are testimonial make the absent declarant a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause (see id.) … When ... a police officer justifiably believes that the assailant no longer poses a threat to the victim, the purpose of his or her interrogation of the victim may ‘evolve’ from dealing with an ongoing emergency to establishing past events with a view to later criminal prosecution (id.). On this record, however, the initial purpose of Officer Doyle’s inquiry did not change.”

In contrast, under the facts of Giles v. California, the statement appears to be testimonial, therefore the Supreme Court must address the constitutional issue and consider whether the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the trial court’s decision to admit the dead victim’s statements into evidence.

The highest appellate court below, the California Supreme Court, concluded the defendant waived the right to confront his accuser by operation of the common law “forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine, since his actions were the very reason that the dead victim was unavailable to testify.

Based on recent decisions from the Supreme Court, I predict that it will uphold the California Supreme Court’s ruling.

This conclusion, while an uncomfortable one for me as a criminal defense attorney, is the only outcome that would make sense from a public policy perspective. To hold otherwise would be to encourage assailants to cause every physical assault to end in death in order to take advantage of the protective umbrella of the Sixth Amendment.

Quite frankly, I’m not sure that the alternative — allowing murderers to benefit from the death of their victim — is one that should be available in a civilized society such as our own.

Are Blood Test Results Obtained Via Warrant Protected by the Physician-Patient Privilege?

People v. Elysee, 49 A.D.3d 33, 847 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dept. 2007) is an interesting case.  The defendant was involved in an automobile accident which involved a fatality.  Shortly thereafter, the defendant was transported to the hospital and a blood samples were obtained via a warrant. 
   

The defendant moved to suppress the blood test results, making the novel argument that the seizure of his blood violated the physician-patient privilege. 

The Court disagreed with the defendant’s assertion, holding that a blood specimen taken by a medical professional is not “information” protected by New York’s statutory physician-patient privilege:

In conclusion, there is nothing in the language of CPLR 4504(a) or in the case law interpreting it that supports its application to the physical blood samples at issue here. Moreover, there is simply no compelling public policy interest that would justify expanding the physician-patient privilege to a physical blood sample. To hold otherwise would deprive the jury of lawfully seized material and probative evidence. Thus, we conclude that the physician-patient privilege is not applicable to a physical blood sample drawn by a medical professional and lawfully seized pursuant to CPL 690.10. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was to suppress the search warrant blood samples.

I haven't researched this issue, but if other Department's have not yet addressed this issue, it might be worth a shot.  Another novel argument that I've seen made in other jurisdictions is that seizure of a blood sample violates HIPAA.  I'm not sure if that argument has been made in New York, but again--it's worth a try.

Futile Degradation

This week's Daily Record column is entitled "Futile Degradation."  The article is set forth in full below and a pdf of the article can be found here.

My past Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

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Futile Degradation

In People v. Hall, 2008 N.Y. Slip 02676, the New York State Court of Appeals considered the issue of whether a “visual body cavity inspection” of an arrestee may be conducted in the absence of a warrant.

The court distinguished between three types of progressively invasive bodily searches prior to reaching its conclusion: “A ‘strip search’ requires the arrestee to disrobe so that a police officer can visually inspect the person’s body. The second type of examination — a ‘visual body cavity inspection’ — occurs when a police officer looks at the arrestee’s anal or genital cavities, usually by asking the arrestee to bend over; however, the officer does not touch the arrestee’s body cavity. In contrast, a ‘manual body cavity search’ includes some degree of touching or probing of a body cavity that causes a physical intrusion beyond the body’s surface.”

The court then concluded that “visual cavity” inspections were constitutionally permissible as long as the police had reasonable suspicion to believe that contraband, evidence or a weapon was hidden inside the arrestee’s body, while “body cavity” searches conducted in the absence of exigent circumstances were unconstitutional unless authorized by a warrant.

In his concurring opinion, Judge Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick agreed with the majority’s conclusion regarding the constitutionality of manual body cavity searches, but disputed the majority’s determination regarding visual body cavity searches: “[J]ust like a manual body cavity search, this intrusive, degrading, and humiliating species of search may only be conducted upon a neutral and detached magistrate’s issuance of a warrant based upon probable cause. … The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to ‘searches involving intrusions beyond the body’s surface’ (Schmerber, 384 US at 769). Rather, to safeguard the interests in the ‘human dignity and privacy’ that the Search and Seizure Clauses were designed to protect, an intrusion extending beyond the body’s surface may not be undertaken on the ‘mere chance that evidence might be obtained’ (id. at 769-770).”

Judge Ciparick’s convincing arguments notwithstanding, warrantless visual cavity searches of arrestees are now permissible in New York. The majority asserts these invasive searches are required to locate contraband, weapons or drugs, which is certainly the case with those already incarcerated, such as convicted prisoners or pre-trial detainees.

However, outside of the prison environment, visual cavity searches generally are used in an attempt to locate drugs on a recently arrested person suspected of dealing drugs. Thus, as was the case in Hall, these humiliating and degrading searches occur most frequently in the context of the neverending “war on drugs.”

This “war” has resulted in an ever-increasing number of drug prosecutions. More and more Americans are imprisoned, many on drug charges, resulting in the incarceration of about 1 percent of the U.S. population. Our jails are overcrowded and bursting at the seams, yet drug abuse remains relatively steady.

Drug use has been around since the dawn of time. In comparison, the concept of civil rights is a relatively new concept — one that has served as the bedrock of this great nation.

Sadly, in an effort to win this war on drugs, our Fourth Amendment rights have been eroded slowly to the point that they are no longer recognizable. The Hall decision continues this trend by permitting law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless and extremely invasive searches as part of a neverending and futile quest to win a war that cannot be won. Nicole Black is of counsel to Fiandach

Indicting Ham Sandwiches

This week's Legal Currents column, which is published in The Daily Record, is entitled " Indicting a Ham Sandwich"  The article is set forth in full below and a pdf of the article can be found here. My past Legal Currents articles can be accessed here.

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Indicting ham sandwiches

“The grand jury … charges that … Felix Vinluan, with the intent that the defendant nurses engage in conduct constituting the crimes of Endangering the Welfare of a Child … requested and otherwise attempted to cause the nurses to resign immediately from Avalon Gardens.” — PARAGRAPH18 OFTHEGRANDJURY INDICTMENTINPEOPLEV. VINLUAN, I-769A-K-07

In 2006, New York attorney Felix Q. Vinluan, at the behest of the Philippine consulate, met with a number of Philip- pine nurses working in the United States.

As a direct result of that meeting, Vinluan and 10 of the nurses were indicted by a Suffolk County grand jury.

What, you may be wondering, was the alleged crime? Surprisingly, it appears Vinluan was indicted for advising the nurses, his clients, of their legal rights under an employment contract purportedly breached by the employer.

Of course, that’s not how Suffolk County District Attorney Leonard Lato framed the issue. Rather, he claimed Vinluan actively participated in “soliciting” a group of nurses to, simultaneously and without advance notice, quit their jobs at a nursing home that housed a number of ventilator- dependent children and adults.

As is the case with most contract disputes, there are two sides to the story. Disputes of this nature generally are resolved when the trier-of-fact determines which version of events is more closely associated with the ever-elusive “truth.”

Unfortunately, this particular civil dispute resulted in the far more unusual and ominous outcome of the criminal indictment of the employees’ lawyer for providing his legal opinion, simply because that opinion had the potential to negatively impact the lives of others — in this case the nursing home’s patients.

No actual harm resulted, since replacement nurses were obtained. In fact, the New York Department of Health recently concluded the nursing home residents were in no way jeopardized by the mass resignation.

Despite that fact, criminal charges are pending against Vinluan, in yet another example of the increasing trend to criminally prosecute alleged civil wrongs. It seems many prosecutors have yet to grasp the concept that adverse consequences need not always result in criminal prosecution.

The case brings to mind an even more shocking prosecu- tion that occurred in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, when a physician and a number of nurses were indicted based on allegations that they hastened the death of critically ill patients.

The physician and nurses faced a situation unlike any other following the hurricane and breech of the levies. There was no running water, minimal contact with the outside world, supplies were running low and expected rescue efforts were few and far between. The physician made a discretionary decision to reduce the suffering of some of the most ailing patients, and later faced criminal charges for her decision.

Former New York State Court of Appeals Judge Sol Wachtler famously quipped that, at the urging of a good prosecutor, a grand jury “would indict a ham sandwich.”

In the New Orleans case, the grand jury recognized a sandwich is just a sandwich. Sadly, Vinluan was not so lucky.

Why not err on the side of caution?

This week's Legal Currents column, which is published in The Daily Record, is entitled " Why not err on the side of caution?"  The article is set forth in full below and a pdf of the article can be found here. My past Legal Currents articles can be accessed here.

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Why not err on the side of caution?

Last week the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Herring v. United States, 07- 513.

At issue in Herring is whether the exclusionary rule should apply when a suspect’s arrest was based on erroneous information from another law enforcement officer.

The court considered a similar issue in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). In Evans, marijuana was discovered on the defendant during the execution of what the arresting officer mistakenly believed was a valid arrest warrant. The court concluded the marijuana was not subject to suppression even though the warrant, which had been quashed, remained in the computer system due to a court clerk’s clerical error: “If court employees were re-sponsible for the erroneous computer re-cord, the exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction. … Because court clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime … they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.”

In so holding, the court left open the possibility that the exclusionary rule might apply to evidence discovered due to an error caused by a law enforcement officer, as was the case in Herring, where a member of the Sheriff’s Department, rather than a court clerk, failed to modify the computer records to indicate the arrest warrant was recalled.

I suspect the current court will extend the Evans holding and conclude the exclusionary rule is inapplicable under these facts as well.

To do so would be a mistake.

As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg astutely noted in her dissentin Evans, society’s newfound reliance on computers and technological advancements presents unusual issues for law enforcement: “Widespread reliance on computers to store and convey information generates, along with manifold benefits, new possibilities of error, due to both computer malfunctions and operator mistakes. … [C]omputerization greatly amplifies an error’s effect, and correspondingly intensifies the need for prompt correction; for inaccurate data can infect not only one agency, but the many agencies that share access to the database.”

Justice Ginsberg’s insight from 1995 rings all the more true in our post-9/11 era as our government mines and collects vast amounts of data regarding its citizens, both from public and private sources.

The more data is collected, the more time and money will be required to manage the data. It is unlikely, however, that sufficient resources will be allotted for regulating, reviewing and updating the massive databases used by law enforcement agencies in the absence of strong incentives such as the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.

Should the court carve out a “computer error” exception to the exclusionary rule, the possibility of perpetual arrest warrants is not all that farfetched. Realistically, what incentive would there be to promptly remove recalled arrest warrants from government databases if any evidence obtained as a result of a mistakenly executed, recalled warrant could be used at trial?

To err is human. We all know that. But when one of our most fundamental constitutional rights is at stake— freedom from unlawful governmental intrusion — shouldn’t we err on the side of caution?

Third Department Holds Miranda Violation Warrants New Trial

In People v VanPatten, 2007 NY Slip Op 10408, the defendant was convicted after jury trial of Making a Terrroristic Threat in violation of Penal Law 240.20.  The defendant, while in custody on a parole violation, was accused of writing a letter to the Madison County District Attorney threatening the lives of the DA and his family unless he stopped prosecuting crimes violating Article 49 of the Penal Law.  The only person being prosecuted pursuant to that Article at the time the letter was sent was the defendant's biological father.

The defendant, who was incarcerated at the time, allegedly confessed to writing the threatening letter when speaking with a police investigator.  The confession occurred after the investigator informed Mr. VanPatten of the lengthy list of questions he intended to ask regarding the letter.  Following the initial "spontaneous" confession, the investigator advised him of his Miranda rights and he confessed again.

The Third Department held the trial court should have suppressed the entire confession:

When "the circumstances of the detention and interrogation of a prison inmate . . . entail added constraint that would lead a prison inmate reasonably to believe that there has been a restriction on that person's freedom over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility, Miranda warnings are necessary" (People v Alls, 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1994]; see People v Ward, 241 AD2d 767, 768 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 837 [1997]). Here, the interrogation of [*3]defendant at the detention facility which took place in a classroom with correction officers standing outside the door while defendant was not permitted to leave on his own was custodial in nature...In our view, Nell's explanation to defendant regarding why he wanted to speak with defendant was the functional equivalent of interrogation and, thus, County Court's determination that the statement was spontaneous is not supported by the record (see People v Vaughn, 275 AD2d 484, 487 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 788 [2001])...The entire interview took place over the course of approximately 30 minutes in a single location, without any break in questioning, and was, as Nell testified, "just [*4]one continuous process." Thus, defendant's warned statements were obtained as part of a "single continuous chain of events" and must also be suppressed.

What confounds me about this case is that the cops didn't play by the book given the strength of the evidence against the defendant.

The threatening letter "included defendant's full name, prison identification number and the address of the detention facility where defendant was held on unrelated parole violation charges", "fingerprints found on the letter were traceable to defendant" and the defendant's father was the only person currently facing charges for the crime mentioned in the letter.

Seems like a slam dunk even without the confession.  Now they're back to square one.  That'll learn 'em.