As I'd posted previously, D-day for the Lawsuit challenging the New York lawyer advertising rules is June 18, 2007. The parties stipulated to the facts and waived the trial that had been previously scheduled. Instead, the plaintiffs have cross-moved for summary judgment, and on June 18th, at the very least, the Court is expected to rule on the motion for a preliminary injunction, and may possibly offer a ruling on the motions for summary judgment as well.
Available for your perusal are the following documents:
adj. uncertain; usually applied to insurance contracts in which payment is dependent on the occurrence of a contingent event, such as injury to the insured person in an accident or fire damage to his insured building.
This week's Legal Currents column, which is published in The Daily Record, is entitled "Lady Law Is Not Entirely Inflexible." The article is set forth in full below, and a pdf of the article can be found here.
I always thought that George Orwell’s novel
1984 was, at most, a disturbing work of fiction.
Inexplicably, in the wake of 9/11, many
aspects of the horrifying and surreal society
described in Or-well’s most famous novel have
become reality in America.
Pervasive video surveillance is one of the more obvious
and disturbing manifestations of this fictional work. In
many cities across America, intricate video surveillance networks,
both publicly and privately owned, are being established
to capture the day-to-day activities of ordinary citizens.
By way of example, in 1998 there were only 769 surveillance
cameras in New York City. Today, it is estimated that
there are more than 10,000, with more being added each
day. At this rate, the city will soon catch up to London,
which has more than 500,000 video surveillance cameras
monitoring citizens’ every move.
Other cities throughout the country are following in step
and our fair city of Rochester is not immune to the phenomenon:
In November 2006, Roch-ester was awarded
funding to establish a video surveillance network and the
Rochester Police Department is in the process of implementing
a surveillance system.
Some fear that at this rate, in just a few years, the United
States will soon have more surveillance cameras within its
borders than the 4 million video cameras currently installed
throughout Britain.
Proponents of video surveillance contend “video never
lies.” Recent court decisions suggest that the appropriate
inquiry is not whether video is truthful, but rather, what isthe meaning of the images portrayed on video?
In the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Scott
v. Harris, no. 05-1631, the answer to this inquiry
was, not surprisingly, that reasonable minds can
differ.
In Scott, the court viewed videotape of a high
speed chase and concluded that: “[W]ith regard
to the factual issue [of] whether respondent was
driving in such fashion as to endanger human life
… [r]espondent’s version of events is so utterly
discredited by the record that no reasonable jury
could have believed him.”
The decision was reached despite the fact that
the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals viewed the tape
and concluded there were issues of fact concerning that issue,
as Justice John Paul Stevens did in his dissent.
Similarly, in a recent First Department decision, Rivera v.
City of New York, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op 04153, videotape of a
protest, which resulted in arrests the plaintiffs alleged were
unlawful, was viewed by a jury, the trial court and the First
Department.
The jury concluded that the arrest was unlawful and
awarded $80,375,000 to the plaintiffs. The trial court agreed
with the jury’s factual findings, but determined the award to
be excessive, reducing it to $635,000.
The First Department, after watching the same videotape
viewed by the jury and the trial court, vacated the judgment
and dismissed the complaint against the defendants, concluding
that: “Any rational person, objectively looking at the video
and reviewing the other evidence, would find the police more
than justified in their concern that this episode might escalate
into violence.”
It would seem that the lesson to be learned is that while a
video never lies, interpretations of its content can be drastically
different.
In the post-9/11 era of increasing video surveillance, is it the
new rule of law that, when facts can be gleaned from videotape,
the interpretations of judges on higher courts trump the less rational perspective of lower court judges and juries? Will
the need for juries and lower courts be erased with the advent
of increasingly invasive and pervasive video surveillance?
Will appellate judges take on the role of Big Brother and
decide the facts for us?
For the sake of our country and our judicial system, I certainly
hope not.
*****
Here's a disturbing CNBC video on how American's lives are being monitored by our government and by private parties.
And, the following video is an NBC report on the use of "talking" video surveillance cameras in the UK. The wave of the future for the US, perhaps? Let's hope not.
I hope that everyone takes time out this Memorial Day to remember those who have served our country and are doing so as we speak. We owe them our deepest gratitude and respect. And, I hope that you all enjoy this day off in their honor.
At issue in Mc Carthy v Bellamy,
2007 NY Slip Op 0338, was whether the trial court properly denied the defendants' motioin for summary judgment.
The plaintiff commenced the lawsuit seeking damages for injuries to her cervical spine allegedly sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident. The defendants subsequently brought a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to allege serious injury.
The Fourth Department concluded that the motion should have been granted:
"E]ven where there is objective medical proof [of a serious injury], when additional contributory factors interrupt the chain of causation between the accident and claimed injury——such as a gap in treatment, an intervening medical problem or a preexisting condition——summary dismissal of the complaint may be appropriate... Here, the record establishes that in 1999 plaintiff complained of left-sided neck pain that had persisted for three months, resulting in an x-ray showing "minimal spondylosis" and "possible minor cervical degenerative disease." Plaintiffs' failure to acknowledge or address that preexisting condition in opposition to the motion renders the opinion of plaintiffs' expert "speculative"...
We likewise agree with defendants that plaintiffs' failure to explain a 15-month gap in plaintiff's treatment renders summary judgment dismissing the complaint appropriate...(Internal citations and quotations omitted).
I suppose the lesson to be learned from this case, assuming the plaintiff's response to the defendants' motion is characterized accurately, is that it's probably not a good idea to ignore your opponents' assertions. Simply setting forth facts which establish serious injury without addressing the alleged weaknesses in your case is probably unwise--at least in the Fourth Department and most certainly in this case.
Earlier this month, in O'Mara v Town of Wappinger, Docket Nos. 06-0078-cv(L), 06-1323-cv(CON), the Second Circuit certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals:
Is an open space restriction imposed by a subdivision plat under New York Town Law §
276 enforceable against a subsequent purchaser, and under what circumstances?
Thursday's term was justiciable, which is defined as:
n. referring to a matter which is capable of being decided by a court. Usually it is combined in such terms as: "justiciable issue," "justiciable cause of action" or "justiciable case.
People v. Newton, 2007 NY Slip Op 03754, is a really interesting New York Court of Appeals decision from earlier this month--and one that I disagree with. My disagreement with the decision comes as bit of a surprise to me, since I have a difficult time wearing my criminal-defense-attorney-colored-glasses when it comes to sex crimes. I can do it, but it's not easy for me.
But, in this case, when I put those glasses on, I find myself disagreeing with the Court's decision.
The Court upheld the trial court's ruling which denied the defendant's request to charge the jury that his intoxication at the time of the alleged conduct was an affirmative defense to the charge of Sodomy in the Third Degree. Instead, the trial court advised the jury that intoxication is not a defense to that crime "under any circumstances."
As explained in the Court's decision:
To be guilty of third-degree sodomy under Penal Law § 130.40(3), defendant was required to have engaged in the sexual act "with another person without such person's consent where such lack of consent [was] by reason of some factor other than incapacity to consent."
The Sexual Assault Reform Act fleshed out this crime by specially defining "lack of consent" for purposes of third-degree sodomy as
"circumstances under which, at the time [of the sexual act], the victim clearly expressed that he or she did not consent to engage in such act, and a reasonable person in the actor's situation would have understood such person's words and acts as an expression of lack of consent to such act under all the circumstances"
(Penal Law § 130.05[2][d]).
The Court concluded that since the "defendant's subjective mental state is not an element of the crime of third-degree sodomy, evidence of intoxication at the time of the sexual act is irrelevant." The Court's rationale was that:
(T)he proper inquiry for the factfinder is not whether a defendant actually perceives a lack of consent, but whether the victim, by words or actions, clearly expresses an unwillingness to engage in the sexual act in such a way that a neutral observer would have understood that the victim was not consenting.
I've got a problem with that conclusion. Granted, the defendant's mens rea is not an element of this crime, but the defendant's perception of the victim's alleged lack of consent is important. Lack of consent is to be viewed from the perspective of one in the defendant's situation, and one's intoxication can certainly affect one's perception.
I don't think that intoxication should be an absolute defense to any crime, especially not sex crimes. If that were the case, then everyone would have a green light to get loaded and then rape and pillage to their heart's content with the knowledge that their intoxication effectively shielded them from prosecution for their actions.
Not a great message to send to our citizens--especially those living in fraternity houses, but I most certainly digress.
I think that Eric at Indignant Indigent hit the nail on the head with his analysis of this case:
(I)t seems to go a bit further than necessary to say that evidence of intoxication is "irrelevant" to the crime of third-degree sodomy...If the defendant is intoxicated at the time of the incident, then it would seem the proper inquiry for the jury is whether a reasonable, intoxicated person would have understood the complainant's words and actions to indicate a lack of consent. While not technically an affirmative defense that needs to be charged to the jury, a defendant's intoxication is nevertheless a fact to be considered by the jury in determining guilt.
As reported in this Buffalo Business First article, yesterday Governor Spitzer appointed Chief Administrative Judge Jonathan Lippman to serve as Presiding Justice for the Appellate Division, First Department:
Lippman is the longest serving chief administrative judge in state history. He was appointed to that position in 1996 while serving as judge on the Court of Claims, and has continued serving as such since then.
In 2005, he was elected as a Supreme Court justice for the 9th Judicial District and was then appointed as an associate justice for the Appellate Term for the 9th and 10th Judicial Districts.
A New York City native, Lippman received both his undergraduate and law degrees from New York University.
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As I'd posted previously, D-day for the Lawsuit challenging the New York lawyer advertising rules is June 18, 2007. The parties stipulated to the facts and waived the trial that had been previously scheduled. Instead, the plaintiffs have cross-moved for summary judgment, and on June 18th, at the very least, the Court is expected to rule on the motion for a preliminary injunction, and may possibly offer a ruling on the motions for summary judgment as well.
